z-logo
open-access-imgOpen Access
Hume’s theory of social constitution of the self
Author(s) -
Siyaves Azeri
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
filozofija i društvo
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.116
H-Index - 1
eISSN - 2334-8577
pISSN - 0353-5738
DOI - 10.2298/fid1904511a
Subject(s) - passions , constitution , epistemology , impossibility , empiricism , self , self consciousness , philosophy , reflexive pronoun , consciousness , sociology , law , political science
Hume distinguishes between the self of thought and imagination and the self of the passions. He is criticized for contradicting himself as he allegedly attributes fictitiousness to the self in book one of the Treatise but later reintroduces the self in books two and three. Hume?s account of the idea of the self, however, is not contradictory: he shows the impossibility of a pure associationist-empiricist account of the self. Instead, he proposes a social account of the constitution of the idea of the self and consciousness. In doing so, Hume?s account of the self anticipates social-historical theories of the self.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.
Having issues? You can contact us here