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The autonomy of grammar and semantic internalism
Author(s) -
Tamara Dobler
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
filozofija i društvo
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.116
H-Index - 1
eISSN - 2334-8577
pISSN - 0353-5738
DOI - 10.2298/fid1401144d
Subject(s) - internalism and externalism , externalism , philosophy , epistemology , autonomy , grammar , argument (complex analysis) , metaphysics , constructive , transformational grammar , linguistics , predicate (mathematical logic) , computer science , political science , law , biochemistry , chemistry , process (computing) , programming language , operating system
In his post-Tractatus work on natural language use, Wittgenstein defended the notion of what he dubbed the autonomy of grammar. According to this thought, grammar – or semantics, in a more recent idiom – is essentially autonomous from metaphysical considerations, and is not answerable to the nature of things. The argument has several related incarnations in Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus writings, and has given rise to a number of important insights, both critical and constructive. In this paper I will argue for a potential connection between Wittgenstein’s autonomy argument and some more recent internalist arguments for the autonomy of semantics. My main motivation for establishing this connection comes from the fact that the later Wittgenstein’s comments on grammar and meaning stand in opposition to some of the core assumptions of semantic externalism

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