Brandom, Wittgenstein and intersubjectivity

The introductory part of the article deals with general features of\udBrandom’s social pragmatic position. The central part considers Brandom’s\udinterpretation of Kripke’s conception of social character of rules, as well as\udHabermas’ critique of Brandom’s conception of I-thou and I-we types of intersubjectivity.\udIn the final part the author is surveying Brandom’s interpretation\udof Wittgenstein’s understanding of intersubjectivity, as well as of norms and\udrules in general. According to the author, Brandom treats intersubjectivity as\udimmediate communication, while neglecting the role of socially and historically\udshared norms. Also, Brandom rejected justification of rules by past application,\udand, by emphasizing the key role of inferential and practical consequences\udof accepted rules, he considered pragmatic attitudes and commitments\udas oriented towards future validation of meaning and rules. The author also\udclaims that, from Wittgensteinian perspective, communication and intersubjectivity\udinvolve more a profound re-adjustment of interlocutors’ perspectives\udrather than doxatic interchange of perspectives, as Brandom suggested