Open AccessDispositional explanations in dualism
Author(s) -
Janko Nešić
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
filozofija i društvo
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.116
H-Index - 1
eISSN - 2334-8577
pISSN - 0353-5738
DOI - 10.2298/fid1304218n
Subject(s) - causation , dualism , appeal , explanatory power , epistemology , relevance (law) , physicalism , psychology , order (exchange) , causality (physics) , power (physics) , philosophy , economics , metaphysics , physics , finance , quantum mechanics , political science , law
In order to defend mental explanations dualists may appeal to dispositions (powers). By accepting a powers theory of causation, a dualist can more plausibly defend mental explanations that are given independently of physical explanations. Accepting a power-based theory still comes with a price. Absences and double preventers are not causes in a powers theory, and solutions based on them can only defend their explanatory relevance in mental explanations. There is still a chance that such mental explanations can be causal explanations, though they do not refer to real causes