Explanations, mechanisms, and developmental models: Why the nativist account of early perceptual learning is not a proper mechanistic model

In the last several decades a number of studies on perceptual\udlearning in early infancy have suggested that even infants seem to be sensitive\udto the way objects move and interact in the world. In order to explain the\udearly emergence of infants’ sensitivity to causal patterns in the world some\udpsychologists have proposed that core knowledge of objects and causal relations\udis innate (Leslie & Keeble 1987, Carey & Spelke, 1994; Keil, 1995; Spelke\udet al., 1994). The goal of this paper is to examine the nativist developmental\udmodel by investigating the criteria that a mechanistic model needs to fulfill\udif it is to be explanatory. Craver (2006) put forth a number of such criteria\udand developed a few very useful distinctions between explanation sketches\udand proper mechanistic explanations. By applying these criteria to the nativist\uddevelopmental model I aim to show, firstly, that nativists only partially\udcharacterize the phenomenon at stake without giving us the details of when\udand under which conditions perception and attention in early infancy take\udplace. Secondly, nativist start off with a description of the phenomena to be\udexplained (even if it is only a partial description) but import into it a particular\udtheory of perception that requires further empirical evidence and further\uddefense on its own. Furthermore, I argue that innate knowledge is a good\udcandidate for a filler term (a term that is used to name the still unknown\udprocesses and parts of the mechanism) and is likely to become redundant.\udRecent extensive research on early intermodal perception indicates that the\udmechanism enabling the perception of regularities and causal patterns in\udearly infancy is grounded in our neurophysiology. However, this mechanism\udis fairly basic and does not involve highly sophisticated cognitive structures\udor innate core knowledge. I conclude with a remark that a closer examination\udof the mechanisms involved in early perceptual learning indicates that\udthe nativism / empiricism debate (as usually construed in developmental literature)\udis wrong headed and should be closed