Open AccessIntegration of cognitive and moral enhancement
Author(s) -
Vojin Rakić
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
filozofija i društvo
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.116
H-Index - 1
eISSN - 2334-8577
pISSN - 0353-5738
DOI - 10.2298/fid1202091r
Subject(s) - morality , cognition , perspective (graphical) , human enhancement , social cognitive theory of morality , moral disengagement , duty , psychology , epistemology , social psychology , sociology , philosophy , computer science , theology , artificial intelligence , neuroscience
I will discuss four major perspectives on cognitive enhancement and morality: 1) cognitive enhancement is morally impermissible because humans are not supposed to alter what God has ordained or nature has shaped; 2) cognitive enhancement is our moral duty, because a cognitively upgraded human is a better human; 3) cognitive enhancement is morally permissible only if it is preceded by moral enhancement; 4) cognitive enhancement is morally permissible only if it is a means to moral enhancement. I shall argue that the first three perspectives are less cogent than the fourth. The fourth perspective integrates cognitive and moral enhancement into one whole. I will denote it by (C+M) E. [Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 41004 i 43007