Wittgenstein on language and nature

The text begins with the analysis of two terms regarding life crucial to \udboth Wittgenstein's early and late philosophy. These are life form and nature, \udspecifically, human nature. Wittgenstein treats both concepts in a very specific \udmanner, different from the traditional approach of philosophy. He also criticized \udphilosophical attempts to attribute special characteristics to human intellectual \udabilities which would separate them from natural processes. A particular 'spiritual' \udstatus of epistemic and other rational powers disappears when there is an insight \udinto their dependence on discursive practices and specific forms of life on which \udthese powers are based. Concepts such as certainty, knowledge, or explanations \uddo not rest on a rational foundation, that is, they do not refer to processes with \udparticular un-natural properties. Nor can they be reduced to neuro-physiological \udprocesses, either. Instead, it is a specific grammar of their usage that makes them \uddifferent from other concepts describing physical or biological processes. In that \udsense, Wittgenstein develops a non-reductionist version of naturalism which \udpreserves the diversity of human relations in the world