
The monitoring role of nonexecutive directors in Vietnam from a return-volatility perspective
Author(s) -
Anh Tho To,
Quoc Tran,
Thi Phuong Anh Tran,
Kim Phong Thai,
Thi Thu Hong Ho
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
economic annals
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.148
H-Index - 12
eISSN - 1820-7375
pISSN - 0013-3264
DOI - 10.2298/eka2024029t
Subject(s) - endogeneity , volatility (finance) , vietnamese , business , stock market , principal–agent problem , accounting , financial economics , stock (firearms) , monetary economics , economics , econometrics , finance , corporate governance , mechanical engineering , paleontology , linguistics , philosophy , horse , engineering , biology
This study examines the relevance of board independence to stock return volatility for a sample of 160 companies listed on the Vietnamese stock market over ten years (2008-2017). After controlling for potential endogeneity, we find that the presence of non-executive directors on the board tends to increase firm risk. The results indicate that non-executive directors do not play a supervisory role under the agency theory. Our findings remain robust when we apply alternative measures of the dependent variable.
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