Open AccessGlasanje i drustveni izbor
Author(s) -
B Dragan Azdejkovic
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
economic annals/ekonomski anali
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.148
H-Index - 12
eISSN - 1820-7375
pISSN - 0013-3264
DOI - 10.2298/eka0205083a
Subject(s) - voting , cardinal voting systems , anti plurality voting , approval voting , disapproval voting , axiom , bullet voting , benchmark (surveying) , mathematical economics , computer science , political science , politics , economics , mathematics , geography , law , geometry , geodesy
The choice of a voting rule is one of the major ethical question with far-reaching implications on the behavior of the political and other institutions. In this paper we search for a practical voting rule that can be recommended from a certain theoretical aspect. We will study the properties of various voting rules from an axiomatic angle. When only two candidates are at stake, simple majority voting is unambiguously the fairest method. This principle is a benchmark for democratic decision making. We analyze voting for three or more candidates. What voting rule would properly extend majority voting among pairs? .