Open AccessAxioms concerning uncertain disagreement points in 2-person bargaining problems
Author(s) -
Youngsub Chun,
AUTHOR_ID
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
journal of mechanism and institution design
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2399-8458
pISSN - 2399-844X
DOI - 10.22574/jmid.2021.12.002
Subject(s) - axiom , lexicographical order , mathematical economics , bargaining problem , set (abstract data type) , point (geometry) , mathematics , computer science , combinatorics , geometry , programming language
We consider 2-person bargaining situations in which the feasible set is known, but the disagreement point is uncertain. We investigate the implications of various axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points and characterize the family of linear solutions, which includes the egalitarian, lexicographic egalitarian, Nash, and Kalai-Rosenthal solutions. We also show that how the important subfamilies (or members) of this family can be singled out by imposing additional axioms or strengthening the axioms used in the characterizations.