Open AccessOn Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game
Author(s) -
Papatya Duman,
Walter Trockel
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
journal of mechanism and institution design
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2399-8458
pISSN - 2399-844X
DOI - 10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003
Subject(s) - subgame , subgame perfect equilibrium , mathematical economics , nash equilibrium , trembling hand perfect equilibrium , solution concept , stochastic game , bargaining problem , folk theorem , repeated game , symmetric equilibrium , foundation (evidence) , correlated equilibrium , epsilon equilibrium , best response , equilibrium selection , mathematics , game theory , archaeology , history
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