Open AccessAn economic analysis of the European commission’s proposal for a European account
Author(s) -
Nicholas Kyriakides
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
risk governance and control: financial markets and institutions
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2077-4303
pISSN - 2077-429X
DOI - 10.22495/rgcv3i4art5
Subject(s) - order (exchange) , law and economics , european union , utilitarianism , commission , european commission , section (typography) , legislation , economic justice , economics , work (physics) , scope (computer science) , political science , public economics , law , business , computer science , international trade , engineering , finance , mechanical engineering , advertising , programming language
This paper performs an economic analysis of the European Commission’s proposal for a European-wide preservation order. Bentham’s utilitarianism theory suggests that legislators must take into mind the pleasures and pains associated with any legislation and to form laws in order to create the greatest good for the greatest number. These ideas are reflected in the modern economic theories of welfare economics. But are these principles sufficient to create effective legal rules and achieve justice? Section 2 of this work analyzes the difficulties in obtaining a provisional measure to preserve another party’s assets in another Member State of the European Union (“EU”). Section 3 sets out the Commission’s proposal for a European Account Preservation Order (“EAPO”). Section 4 applies welfare economics principles in order to identify the effect of legal rules related to this proposal, while it proposes an alternative approach to these principles. Lastly, section 4 makes suggestions on the proposal based on this alternative approach.