Open AccessInstitutional investors, stewardship code, and corporate performance: International evidence
Author(s) -
Yutaro Shiraishi,
Naoshi Ikeda,
Yasuhiro Arikawa,
Kenji Inoue
Publication year - 2019
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Conference proceedings
DOI - 10.22495/cpr19a13
Subject(s) - institutional investor , stewardship (theology) , business , portfolio , incentive , accounting , code (set theory) , quality (philosophy) , finance , corporate governance , economics , market economy , computer science , philosophy , set (abstract data type) , epistemology , politics , political science , law , programming language
This study investigates if stewardship code enhances monitoring activities of institutional investors on their portfolio firms. Stewardship Codes aim to enhance the quality of engagement between institutional investors and companies. Since institutional investors who typically hold diversified portfolio should have little incentive to monitor their portfolio firms due to free-rider problem, the stewardship code, which is designed to motivate institutional investors to monitor, becomes important in countries with high institutional ownership