Open AccessCorporate governance in UK banks
Author(s) -
Paul Chisnall
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
corporate ownership and control
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1810-0368
pISSN - 1727-9232
DOI - 10.22495/cocv7i4sip1
Subject(s) - risk appetite , corporate governance , financial crisis , business , agency (philosophy) , systemic risk , financial system , psychological resilience , resilience (materials science) , bank failure , accounting , risk management , economics , finance , macroeconomics , psychology , philosophy , physics , thermodynamics , epistemology , psychotherapist
The crisis engulfing the World’s financial markets for the past two to three years has involved coordinated action on the part of governments, central banks, regulators and the industry itself on a scale rarely seen and as we approach mid-2010 the signs are that the crisis has been abated. During this time there has been much debate on the underlying causes of the financial crisis and the broad consensus is that the blend of macroeconomic factors and intellectual assumptions that contributed included. It is clearly also the case that many banks over-estimated their capacity to mitigate risk and that - whether in terms of culture, appetite or processes - their boards and risk management fell short of the required standard. The understanding of the broad nature of the underlying causes of the crisis has guided the regulatory response. Much of this activity has been guided by the Financial Stability Board, reporting to the G20, and in broad terms this regulatory change has comprised three components: to strengthen the resilience of the financial system; to reduce the impact and systemic effect of bank failure; and to improve intergovernmental and cross-agency cooperation.