Open AccessIs family business beautiful? Evidence from Italian stock market
Author(s) -
Daniela Venanzi,
Ottorino Morresi
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
corporate ownership and control
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1810-0368
pISSN - 1727-9232
DOI - 10.22495/cocv7i3c1p2
Subject(s) - stewardship (theology) , perspective (graphical) , business , shareholder , corporate governance , stewardship theory , family business , agency (philosophy) , stock market , accounting , stock (firearms) , principal–agent problem , marketing , finance , political science , sociology , law , mechanical engineering , paleontology , social science , horse , artificial intelligence , politics , computer science , biology , engineering
From the agency perspective, literature studying links between investor protection and governance profiles argues that family is more disposed than other shareholders to divert private benefits in countries with a poor legal framework: the question is empirically puzzling. From the stewardship perspective, the degree of familiness affects the stewardship attitude of the firm. We do not find that family firms perform worse or better than non-family counterparts. Some evidence is found as regards the entrenchment effect: family CEOs seem to weaken firm performance. Stewardship attitude – not familiness – does matter: moderate levels of stewardship improve performance and increase risk-taking.