Open AccessControl and risk of CEO compensation.
Author(s) -
María Dolores ÁlvarezPérez,
Edelmira Neira Fontela,
Carmen Castro Casal
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
corporate ownership and control
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1810-0368
pISSN - 1727-9232
DOI - 10.22495/cocv6i2c3p4
Subject(s) - executive compensation , chief executive officer , business , compensation (psychology) , control (management) , accounting , industrial organization , corporate governance , finance , management , economics , psychology , social psychology
This study analyses the influence of various characteristics of the Board of Directors on the control and risk of the compensation of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). It also examines the effect on these variables of some of the CEO personal characteristics and of various contingencies of the firm. The results reveal that control of the CEO compensation is determined fundamentally by the CEO participation in the capital of the firm, while the level of risk of the CEO compensation package is higher when the firm is diversified and implements a proactive competitive strategy.