Open AccessBoard changes following mergers
Author(s) -
Donna L. Paul
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
corporate ownership and control
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1810-0368
pISSN - 1727-9232
DOI - 10.22495/cocv5i3p8
Subject(s) - independence (probability theory) , business , negotiation , bargaining power , cash flow , representation (politics) , accounting , monetary economics , economics , political science , microeconomics , law , statistics , mathematics , politics
This study documents an overall increase in board independence and size following completed mergers. The increase in board size is positively related to the size of the target firm, suggesting either that large targets have bargaining power to negotiate inclusion of their directors on the board of the merged firm, or that high target director representation is perceived to be vital in mergers of equals. The change in board independence is positively related to post-merger cash flow difficulty, suggesting that independent directors are more likely to be added if the firm faces financial constraints.