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Vrais Amis: Reconsidering the Philosophical Relationship Between Foucault and Deleuze
Author(s) -
Christian Gilliam
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
foucault studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.124
H-Index - 23
ISSN - 1832-5203
DOI - 10.22439/fs.v0i25.5580
Subject(s) - immanence , deleuze and guattari , subjectification , pleasure , epistemology , ontic , philosophy , power (physics) , will to power , divergence (linguistics) , transcendence (philosophy) , dialectic , sociology , psychoanalysis , psychology , linguistics , physics , quantum mechanics , neuroscience
In the current literature addressing the Foucault/Deleuze relationship, there is a clear tendency to either replicate and expand Foucault’s over-simplified rejection of Deleuzian desire as already caught in a discursive trap or play of power; or to replicate Deleuze and Guattari’s over-simplified reading of Foucault’s dispositif, in which power and resistance are deemed opposed and thus understood via a structure of negativity. In either case, each thinker is accused of referring to an asocial or essentialist multiplicity, typically in the form of a real transcendence (positive Body), which is deemed ‘inconsistent’ with their post-structuralist yearnings. This article argues that there is in fact a real and enduring consistency between the two thinkers, which is to be found in the mutual use of an ontology of ‘pure’ or ‘disjunctive’ immanence – as derived from and developed through Nietzsche’s method of genealogy – as a way to construe power/subjectification, with pleasure/desire taken as the affective inside of this power. That said, the somewhat semantic difference between desire and pleasure being proposed does lead to a slight, though tangible, divergence in politico-ethical and practical possibilities. This article concludes that it is this divergence that should from the real basis of debate.

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