Open AccessPutting Reasons in their Place
Author(s) -
José Ángel Gascón
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
informal logic
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.368
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 2293-734X
pISSN - 0824-2577
DOI - 10.22329/il.v40i4.6070
Subject(s) - argumentation theory , epistemology , reflection (computer programming) , cognition , sociology , psychology , philosophy , computer science , neuroscience , programming language
Hilary Kornblith has criticised reasons-based approaches to epistemic justification on the basis of psychological research that shows that reflection is unreliable. Human beings, it seems, are not very good at identifying our own cognitive processes and the causes of our beliefs. In this article I defend a conception of reasons that takes those empirical findings into account and can avoid Kornblith’s objections. Reasons, according to this account, are not to be identified with the causes of our beliefs and are useful first and foremost in argumentation instead of reflection.