Inference, Circularity, and Begging the Question | Zendy

Matthew W. McKeon | Zendy

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Inference, Circularity, and Begging the Question

Author(s) -

Matthew W. McKeon

Publication year - 2015

Publication title -

informal logic

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.368

H-Index - 15

eISSN - 2293-734X

pISSN - 0824-2577

DOI - 10.22329/il.v35i3.4295

Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , begging , inference , semantic reasoner , epistemology , statement (logic) , philosophy , computer science , artificial intelligence , biochemistry , chemistry , theology

I develop a syntactic concept of circularity, which I call propositional circularity. With respect to a given use of an argument advanced as a statement of inference for the benefit of a reasoner R, if the direct and indirect premises R would have to accept in order to accept the conclusion includes the conclusion, then the collection of premises is propositionally circular. The argument fails to display a type of inference that R can perform. Appealing to propositional circularity, I articulate a sufficient condition for a use of an argument to beg the question, highlighting why question-begging is a defect.

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