Open AccessInference, Circularity, and Begging the Question
Author(s) -
Matthew McKeon
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
informal logic
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.368
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 2293-734X
pISSN - 0824-2577
DOI - 10.22329/il.v35i3.4295
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , begging , inference , semantic reasoner , epistemology , statement (logic) , philosophy , computer science , artificial intelligence , biochemistry , chemistry , theology
I develop a syntactic concept of circularity, which I call propositional circularity. With respect to a given use of an argument advanced as a statement of inference for the benefit of a reasoner R, if the direct and indirect premises R would have to accept in order to accept the conclusion includes the conclusion, then the collection of premises is propositionally circular. The argument fails to display a type of inference that R can perform. Appealing to propositional circularity, I articulate a sufficient condition for a use of an argument to beg the question, highlighting why question-begging is a defect.