Philosophy, Adversarial Argumentation, and Embattled Reason
Author(s) -
Phyllis Rooney
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
informal logic
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.368
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 2293-734X
pISSN - 0824-2577
DOI - 10.22329/il.v30i3.3032
Subject(s) - argumentation theory , metaphor , adversarial system , argument (complex analysis) , persuasion , epistemology , narrative , philosophy , sociology , aesthetics , law , political science , linguistics , biochemistry , chemistry
Philosophy’s adversarial argumentation style is often noted as a factor contributing to the low numbers of women in philosophy. I argue that there is a level of adversariality peculiar to philosophy that merits specific feminist examination, yet doesn’t assume controversial gender differences claims. The dominance of the argument-as-war metaphor is not warranted, since this metaphor misconstrues the epistemic role of good argument as a tool of rational persuasion. This metaphor is entangled with the persisting narrative of embattled reason, which, in turn, is linked to the sexism-informed narrative of the “man of reason” continually warding off or battling “feminine” unreason.
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