Open AccessCorporate Governance And Tax Aggressiveness: Agency Theory Relationship
Author(s) -
Bani Alkausar,
Farel Badar Kawakibi,
Mienati Somya Lasmana
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
jurnal reviu akuntansi dan keuangan
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2615-2223
pISSN - 2088-0685
DOI - 10.22219/jrak.v11i1.15610
Subject(s) - accounting , business , audit committee , corporate governance , audit , corporate tax , commit , principal–agent problem , quality audit , stock exchange , tax avoidance , finance , double taxation , database , computer science
The study aimed to provide evidence of whether corporate governance can lower the tendency of companies to perform tax aggressiveness. The term of Tax Aggressiveness was used to further expand the meaning of the act of minimizing taxes by companies. The cash effective tax rate was used as an indicator of the tax aggressiveness of companies. Meanwhile, corporate governance was measured by the institutional ownership, independent commissioner, audit committee, and audit quality. Samples used were the manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in 2018. Results of the 97 samples observed indicated that independent commissioners proved to be able to suppress the tendency of companies to commit Tax Aggressiveness; meanwhile, the institutional ownership, audit committee, and audit quality was not proven. The existence of the independent commissioners is able to influence the decisions in creating policies that are set by the management, so the management does not perform an opportunistic action that would benefit the management including committing Tax Aggressiveness.