Open AccessLinguistic Knowledge and Cognitive Integration
Author(s) -
Edison Barrios
Publication year - 2012
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.101
H-Index - 6
ISSN - 1870-4905
DOI - 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2012.780
Subject(s) - doxastic logic , argument (complex analysis) , linguistics , grammar , cognition , epistemology , speech act , philosophy , psychology , biochemistry , chemistry , neuroscience
According to the Propositional Attitude view (PAV), a speaker is competent in her language by virtue of holding propositional attitudes towards the contents of her internal grammar. This paper develops an objection to PAV, called the “Integration Challenge”. This argument, originally suggested by Stich (1978) and Evans (1981), comprises two premises: (1) propositional attitudes are characterized by their inferential integration with other doxastic states, and (2) the cognitive states that store grammatical information are not inferentially integrated. I consider and reject replies to this argument made by Dwyer and Pietroski (1996), Higginbotham, (1987) and Knowles (2000).