Open AccessResearch on Green Construction Supervision Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game
Author(s) -
Wei Wei,
Zhangfeng Qin
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
world journal of social science research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2375-9747
pISSN - 2332-5534
DOI - 10.22158/wjssr.v5n1p98
Subject(s) - evolutionarily stable strategy , mechanism (biology) , stability (learning theory) , point (geometry) , evolutionary game theory , strategy , game theory , computer science , basis (linear algebra) , business , mathematical economics , mathematics , machine learning , philosophy , geometry , epistemology
On the basis of the analysis of the game relationship between the construction enterprise and the supervision department, the evolutionary game model of the green construction supervision is established. By analyzing the unilateral stability of the game player, it is found that when the regulatory probability of regulatory authorities is maintained at the corresponding regulatory probability of the mixed strategy equilibrium point, the green construction probability of construction enterprises will evolve to 100%, and has good stability. According to this, the supervision mechanism of setting the threshold of supervision probability is put forward so as to realize full coverage of green construction.