Open AccessAPPLICATION OF CONFLICT MODEL FOR COUNTERACTION MECHANISMS STUDY OF STATE AND TERRORISM (ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY)
Author(s) -
М. Б. Колотков
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
izvestiâ ûgo-zapadnogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2686-6757
pISSN - 2223-1560
DOI - 10.21869/2223-1560-2017-21-2-198-207
Subject(s) - terrorism , rationality , state (computer science) , power (physics) , conflict resolution research , political science , law and economics , sociology , psychology , law , computer science , conflict resolution , algorithm , physics , quantum mechanics
This article is devoted to interaction mechanisms study (counteraction) of state and terrorism on the basis of conflict model application. Consequences of such interaction and also options of received results used in state and legal practice are investigated (on the example of fight against terror in the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th century). Separate parameters influencing formation of complete theoretical model of the conflict are determined. Method of reflexing system creation developed by V. A. Lefebvre for studying decision-making problem by parties of the conflict is used. Method of reflexing system creation allows investigating not only legal but also social regulators to consider random behavioral factors of conflict participants, and also to influence decision adoption process. One of the parameters influencing creation of effective legal model is awareness for which knowledge concept structure accounting is used. So according to relevant standards of regulatory legal act it is possible to draw a conclusion about the level of power knowledge and about scales and nature of state terrorism. For the state it is necessary to keep information balance between parties of the conflict. It is noted that the system assessment of terrorism condition at the stage preceding decision-making is a key of successful conflict solving both on micro and macro levels. The most irregular shapes of counteraction to terrorist threat are shown in that case when conflicting party consciously neglects rationality principle and in advance provides a certain size of own losses. Attention is focused on separate features of public and secret methods of counteraction in conflict. Special attention is paid to problems of advanced legal impact and choice anticipatory rationing. Anticipatory legal regulation in mediated form reduces the size of potential guilty under behavior regulation.