Open AccessManipulationism and causal exclusion
Author(s) -
Mark PEXTON
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
philosophica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2295-9084
pISSN - 0379-8402
DOI - 10.21825/philosophica.82110
Subject(s) - counterfactual thinking , counterfactual conditional , property (philosophy) , causal reasoning , causal model , causal structure , argument (complex analysis) , context (archaeology) , epistemology , causal decision theory , causality (physics) , causal inference , psychology , mathematics , mathematical economics , cognition , philosophy , econometrics , decision analysis , decision engineering , chemistry , business decision mapping , biology , paleontology , biochemistry , quantum mechanics , statistics , physics , neuroscience
A new way of avoiding the causal exclusion argument in the context of manipulationism is proposed. In manipulationism, causal explanations are defined by counterfactual information accessed through manipulations. It is argued that the property of manipulability can be an emergent property of aggregate systems. Therefore, some causal explanations are non-reducible and causal exclusion is avoided. This emergentist notion of causal explanation addresses the question of how the special sciences can be based upon causal reasoning, even if fundamental physics is absent of causal relations.