Open AccessThe causa sine qua non of Human Cognition for Durand f St. Pourçain
Author(s) -
Maria Clara Pereira e Silva
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
mediaevalia.textos e estudos
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2183-6884
DOI - 10.21747/21836884/med37a5
Subject(s) - intellect , sine qua non , cognition , intuition , object (grammar) , illusion , psychology , sensation , cognitive psychology , cognitive science , philosophy , consciousness , epistemology , linguistics , neuroscience
This article aims to analyze the notion of sine qua non cause of the cognitive theory of Durand’ of St. Pourçain Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard [A] and [C]. For Durand, when the intellect acts by a cognitive act, no absolute entity is added to it. The cognition, or thought, is treated by the author as a relative entity, not as something that belongs to the intellect, or as something that is added to it. The sensible species of the material object, spread in the medium, affects the external sensory organs. Therefore, the sensory faculty notices the changes that occurred in the body and is capable of producing a sensation and the cognitive faculty, on its turn, can produce a conception due to the intuition of the changes that happened in the body to which it is associated. Consequently, there is no need to affirm that a cognitive act is the result of an abstractive process. The culmination of his cognitive theory is the rejection of the existence of an agent intellect responsible for abstracting.