Cultural patterns of corrupt decision-making in Russian organizations

The persistence of corruption in Russia is seen in path-dependent political structures on the one hand, while, on the other hand, concrete corruption-promoting mechanisms can be theoretically described at the level of the actor. The former approach lacks a general explanation of corruption, while the latter lacks the immanent possibility of embedding corrupt practices in specific cultural patterns. Recent approaches in organizational research promise a fruitful connection of both via the idea of organizational corruption, which explains corruption as a normalization process in an organizational context. The present article aims at extending this approach by an analytical model of decision-making in organizations based on a neo-institutional framework. Decision-making situations will be constructed in the activity structure of organizations as the tension between formal-legal requirements and the legitimate goals of the organization as set out in the formal structure. Depending on whether decisions are oriented in accordance or or against legal requirements and the legitimate goals of the organization, a compliant decision, individual corruption, organizational corruption or whistle blowing becomes more likely. Thus, the link between different cultural concepts in Russia and corruption are systematically highlighted and integrated into the present model. It is shown that culturalhistorical patterns cannot be generalized to Russia, but often only promote corruption when specifically embedded in organizations.