Open AccessON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL LANGUAGE IN THE CONTEXT OF WITTGENSTEIN’S MANUSCRIPTS FROM 1929–1933
Author(s) -
Chernavin Georgy
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
horizon. fenomenologičeskie issledovaniâ
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.174
H-Index - 3
eISSN - 2311-6986
pISSN - 2226-5260
DOI - 10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-1-258-267
Subject(s) - impossibility , epistemology , philosophy , analogy , context (archaeology) , criticism , phenomenology (philosophy) , ordinary language philosophy , philosophy of language , reductio ad absurdum , perception , metaphysics , literature , western philosophy , art , history , archaeology , political science , law
The article treats Ludwig Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts where he formulates the problem of impossibility of “phenomenological language” defined by him as the “description of immediate sensual perception without any hypothetical supplementation.” One may find this phase of his philosophy (1929–1933) a bit paradoxical because the philosopher claims this phase, from the very beginning, to have been overcome; we deal here with philosophical self-criticism. The Lewis Carroll’s paradox is considered in terms of analogy to this criticized project of “phenomenological language”—the paradox of a ridiculously exact map which coincides with the mapped area. We open up new possibilities for comparison between the Wittgensteinian project of the “primal language” and Husserlian, Heideggerian and Finkian projects of “phenomenological language.”