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Balancing Investment Incentives and Social Benefits when Protecting Plant Varieties
Author(s) -
Lesser W.,
Mutschler M. A.
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
crop science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.76
H-Index - 147
eISSN - 1435-0653
pISSN - 0011-183X
DOI - 10.2135/cropsci2004.1113
Subject(s) - incentive , variety (cybernetics) , competitor analysis , biology , investment (military) , risk analysis (engineering) , industrial organization , microbiology and biotechnology , environmental resource management , public economics , business , economics , marketing , microeconomics , computer science , political science , artificial intelligence , politics , law
This paper examines the most recent (1991) UPOV modification of Plant Variety Protection systems to provide incentives for prebreeding. We conclude the system is unworkable as presently interpreted and, at a minimum, recommend that national bodies be established to manage minimum enhancements for initial variety status. A more fundamental limitation is the application of a single approach for improvements controlled by single or by multiple gene traits; a relatedness requirement is appropriate for the latter but not the former. We recommend different criteria be applied depending on the type(s) of innovation that characterizes a new variety. Absent that, the incentive structure applies pressure against the use of competitors’ materials in a breeding program, which can delay breeding advances, while not providing significant incentives to encourage introduction of new traits through prebreeding.