
El intelecto en Guillero de Ockham
Author(s) -
Francesc J. Fortuny
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
revista española de filosofía medieval/revista española de filosofía medieval
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.101
H-Index - 1
eISSN - 2530-7878
pISSN - 1133-0902
DOI - 10.21071/refime.v9i.9344
Subject(s) - intellect , soul , philosophy , connotation , epistemology , object (grammar) , subject (documents) , function (biology) , linguistics , computer science , evolutionary biology , library science , biology
The ontological theory about the two aristotelical intellects, created in the 13th century, finishes finally its itinerary with Ockham's epistemological theory. The realistic-propositionalist Ockham's epistemological theory reduces the intellect to a connotation: intellect denotes the soul, or better, the thinking subject whole and one; but connotes the man's cognitival function. The man is essentially free and directs his knowledge to its object, it is life and activity; but the denoted acognitival function is passive.