
The Reading of the Principle of Causality of the Liber de causis in De ecclesiastica potestate of Giles of Rome
Author(s) -
Lucas Oro Hershtein
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
revista española de filosofía medieval/revista española de filosofía medieval
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.101
H-Index - 1
eISSN - 2530-7878
pISSN - 1133-0902
DOI - 10.21071/refime.v24i.10454
Subject(s) - metaphysics , sovereignty , philosophy , causality (physics) , reading (process) , order (exchange) , politics , epistemology , power (physics) , humanities , law , political science , economics , linguistics , physics , finance , quantum mechanics
This paper examines how the metaphysical theses of the Liber de causis are read in De ecclesiastica potestate of Giles of Rome. The hypothesis of this study is that the causal models developed in both texts are different, and therefore the metaphysical theses of the first cannot be the basis for the political theses of the second. Both in the Liber de causis and in De ecclesiastica potestate there is only one causal chain, i.e. in both texts “all power” comes from God. However, this does not imply that in the Liber de causis “the power of all” comes from God. On the contrary, in the Liber de causis, the secondary causes are sovereign in their action. Thus, the political model of the “plenitudo potestatis” - and of expiry of the legal order - built in De ecclesiastica potestate cannot be derived from the metaphysics set out in the Liber de causis.