
The role of employee flexible spending accounts in health care financing.
Author(s) -
Maurice E. Schweitzer,
David A. Asch
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
american journal of public health
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.284
H-Index - 264
eISSN - 1541-0048
pISSN - 0090-0036
DOI - 10.2105/ajph.86.8_pt_1.1079
Subject(s) - incentive , revenue , public economics , health care , health care financing , perspective (graphical) , savings account , balance (ability) , actuarial science , business , economics , finance , medicine , microeconomics , economic growth , artificial intelligence , computer science , physical medicine and rehabilitation
Employee flexible spending accounts for health care represent one component of the current health care financing system that merits serious reform. These accounts create a system of undesirable incentives, force employees and employers to take complicated gambles, reduce tax revenues, and fail to meet their purported policy objectives. This paper describes shortcomings in these accounts from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Some proposed alternatives; including medical spending accounts and zero balance accounts, resolve many of these concerns but not all of them.