Open AccessMoral hazard problem for poor under joint forest management programme evidence from west bengal in Indian context
Author(s) -
Debnarayan Sarker
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
apstract, applied studies in agribusiness and commerce/apstract
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1789-7874
pISSN - 1789-221X
DOI - 10.19041/apstract/2010/5-6/16
Subject(s) - sustenance , livelihood , incentive , joint forest management , subsidy , government (linguistics) , business , work (physics) , moral hazard , context (archaeology) , sustainability , subsistence agriculture , natural resource economics , forest management , economics , political science , geography , forestry , agriculture , engineering , ecology , market economy , microeconomics , law , biology , mechanical engineering , linguistics , philosophy , archaeology
This study explores policy framework on current JFM programme, which secures traditional right of local need subject to the carrying capacity of forest, but face moral hazard problem in which Government cannot legally monitor actions against JFM householdswhich live below poverty line and that extract TFPs for their livelihood, and thereby threatening to sustainability of forest, whereas the incentive work opportunities that Government provides them is insufficient for their subsistence. A good incentive fee dependent on their work plus a lump sum fee (subsidy) are required for their livelihood sustenance and sustainability of forest resources.