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Bundling Strategy For A Follower
Author(s) -
Ming-Chung Chang
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
journal of business and economics research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2157-8893
pISSN - 1542-4448
DOI - 10.19030/jber.v8i9.758
Subject(s) - span (engineering) , style (visual arts) , economics , engineering , art , literature , civil engineering
A follower in a market always uses a bundling strategy as a marketing strategy to increase profit and to change its market status.   In this paper, the relationship between the main goods and bundling goods is substitutive, independent, or complementary.   A Stackelberg game is applied to capture the competitive relationship between a leader and a follower.   A follower uses a bundling strategy as a marketing strategy, but a leader does not.   This study reveals that a follower will become a leader when he (or she) sells two products that are low substitution goods.   However, it induces a social welfare to decrease when a follower bundles goods.   This paper illustrates that a bundling action can invert a follower’s market status.   However, the inversion on a follower’s status does not promote the social welfare.

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