Open AccessDeterminants Of CEO Cash Compensation In Small, Young, Fast Growing Firms
Author(s) -
William Barnes,
T. Harikumar,
Greg Roth
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
journal of business and economics research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2157-8893
pISSN - 1542-4448
DOI - 10.19030/jber.v4i2.2633
Subject(s) - cash , shareholder , harm , business , compensation (psychology) , executive compensation , sample (material) , representation (politics) , monetary economics , labour economics , accounting , demographic economics , finance , corporate governance , economics , law , psychology , chemistry , chromatography , politics , political science , psychoanalysis
This study examines factors related to CEO cash compensation for a sample of publicly-held firms that are small, young, and growing. Our key finding is that founder CEOs accept lower cash compensation than non-founder CEOs. This evidence suggests that, for small, young, and growing firms, founder CEOs do not extract unusually large private benefits that harm outside shareholders. Weaker evidence suggests: firms with greater growth opportunities pay higher cash compensation to CEOs; firms with greater outsider representation on the board pay lower cash compensation to CEOs; and firms with greater inside director share ownership pay higher cash compensation to CEOs.