Open AccessRegulation And Economic Interests
Author(s) -
Bhaskar Das,
William F. Shughart
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
journal of applied business research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.149
H-Index - 22
eISSN - 2157-8834
pISSN - 0892-7626
DOI - 10.19030/jabr.v8i1.6194
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , legislature , outcome (game theory) , politics , government regulation , law and economics , public economics , business , economics , industrial organization , political science , law , microeconomics , biochemistry , chemistry , china
The capture theory of regulation is analyzed in this paper with the motor trucking industry. The evidence supports the argument that regulation is acquired by industry and is designed and operated primarily for industrys benefit. It is also found that the optimal level of regulation provided by the legislature is less than the outcome most desired by the special interests because of the involvement of the political costs.