
An Agency Problem Analysis Of United States Vs. Microsoft
Author(s) -
Steven Scott Stephens
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
the international business and economic research journal/the international business and economics research journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2157-9393
pISSN - 1535-0754
DOI - 10.19030/iber.v1i4.3910
Subject(s) - agency (philosophy) , corporation , economic justice , action (physics) , law , political science , legal action , blame , law and economics , sociology , psychology , social psychology , social science , physics , quantum mechanics
The Justice Department's antitrust case against Microsoft Corporation has generated considerable interest and passionate opinions, but in general is not well understood. This paper explains the legal basis and proceedings of the case in language accessible to the business community. At this writing, the appeals court has affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Microsoft violated the law in several respects, but has reversed the breakup remedy prescribed by the trial judge. Accordingly, this article examines, as a practical matter divorced from legal technicalities, whether there should be any further action taken at all, and if so, what the remedy should be. Interpreting the illegal conduct as symptoms of an agency problem leads to the conclusion that individual- based, rather than corporate- based, remedies would be more reasonable.