Open AccessAddressing A Compensation Anomaly In An Academic Setting
Author(s) -
Michael C. Budden,
Robert F. Cope,
Yu Hsing
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
contemporary issues in education research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1941-756X
pISSN - 1940-5847
DOI - 10.19030/cier.v2i2.1092
Subject(s) - compensation (psychology) , merit pay , productivity , process (computing) , faculty development , psychology , professional development , incentive , computer science , economics , social psychology , pedagogy , microeconomics , macroeconomics , operating system
Faculty compensation is a serious matter. Rewards for performance are an expectation. Managers recognize that rewards often drive performance and productivity. Faculty members who perform well expect to be rewarded well. Faculty members expend considerable time and effort developing evaluation instruments and procedures for assessing and rewarding peer performance. Depending on how the reward process is implemented faculty performance rewards may not result as expected. This paper contrasts faculty compensation models including one that produces a high performance, low compensation anomaly for higher paid faculty.