CHOICE, CONTINGENCY DISCRIMINATION, AND FORAGING THEORY

Four pigeons were trained on eight or nine pairs of independent concurrent variable‐interval schedules. The range of reinforcement ratios included extreme ratios (up to 532 to 1). Large samples of stable performance were gathered. Contrary to the findings of Davison and Jones (1995), the generalized matching law described choice more accurately than a contingency‐discriminability model. Taking small samples (5 to 10 sessions) and applying a more liberal stability criterion used by Davison and Jones only increased the unsystematic variance in the data and in estimates of generalized‐matching‐law sensitivity. Because changing to dependent scheduling and inserting a changeover delay had no systematic effect, the deviations from generalized matching reported by Davison and Jones probably arose from imperfectly discriminated stimuli. Analysis of visits revealed that visits to the nonpreferred alternative were brief and approximately constant. When choice between the preferred (rich) and nonpreferred (lean) alternatives, regardless of position, was analyzed according to the generalized matching law, sensitivities approximated 1.0, with bias in favor of the lean alternative. This bias, which arose from an excessive frequency of visits to the lean alternative, explains undermatching as the result of fitting one line to a choice relation that consists of two displaced lines, both with a slope of 1.0. The pattern of deviation from the generalized matching line confirmed this account. The findings suggest an alternative analysis of choice that focuses on probability of visiting the lean alternative as the dependent variable. This probability was directly proportional to ratio of reinforcement. Matching, undermatching, and overmatching may all be explained by a view of concurrent performance based on foraging theory, in which responding occurs primarily at the rich alternative and is occasionally interrupted by brief visits to the lean alternative.