FINDING THE PHILOSOPHICAL CORE: A REVIEW OF STEPHEN C. PEPPER'S WORLD HYPOTHESES: A STUDY IN EVIDENCE 1

Behavior analysis has always had significant conflicts with other psychological perspectives. At their most fundamental level, these conflicts are often philosophical, concerning such issues as the nature of the human and the purposes of science. Why are these the conflicts? What, if anything, can we do about them? Can we resolve them? Can we avoid them altogether by simply abandoning philosophy? To answer these questions, we must be clear about the philosophy underlying behavior analysis compared to those of other perspectives. To be clear is difficult, however, because the assumptions and postulates of the position are not deliberately and unambiguously laid down. Fundamental assumptions, specific theories, and historical accidents are too often discussed concurrently and without adequate differentiation in behavior-analytic expositions. Skinner's philosophical writings are especially prone to this difficulty, perhaps because he is so extensively involved with so many nonphilosophical aspects of the field. In 1942 Stephen C. Pepper, a philosopher and aestheticist, published World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence. His central insight was that philosophical systems cluster around a few core models, or "world hypotheses," drawn from common sense. His strategy was to ignore details and personalities, and instead to present the central tenets of each world view in a general way. He used his own terms to describe most of these tenets, avoiding excess or parochial meanings. He quoted and cited very little. His style permits an understanding of