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The moral basis for conservation: how is it affected by culture?
Author(s) -
Dickman Amy,
Johnson Paul J,
van Kesteren Freya,
Macdonald David W
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
frontiers in ecology and the environment
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.918
H-Index - 164
eISSN - 1540-9309
pISSN - 1540-9295
DOI - 10.1890/140056
Subject(s) - environmental ethics , relativism , suspect , wildlife , cultural relativism , action (physics) , context (archaeology) , biodiversity , biodiversity conservation , conservation psychology , epistemology , sociology , political science , ecology , geography , law , criminology , human rights , biology , philosophy , physics , archaeology , quantum mechanics
We believe that conservation practice is sometimes inhibited by misguided respect for the cultural background in which conservation problems occur. This respect may be rooted in a philosophical standpoint asserting that culturally distinct values cannot be objectively judged against one another, and that those values are therefore equally valid. Here we consider the influence of this school of thought, known as “moral relativism”, in the context of the moral basis for biodiversity conservation as it is currently understood. We provide examples – in wildlife consumption, land management, and tolerance for releasing invasive species – where we suspect that such relativism has been influential. Although pragmatic constraints associated with human cultures may limit action for achieving conservation goals, we suggest that there are compelling arguments for the advocacy of universal principles, based on science, to protect biodiversity for current and future generations of people.