Open AccessCommon Knowledge, Common Attitudes and Social Reasoning
Author(s) -
Richmond H. Thomason
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
bulletin of the section of logic
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.225
H-Index - 13
eISSN - 2449-836X
pISSN - 0138-0680
DOI - 10.18778/0138-0680.2021.04
Subject(s) - skepticism , epistemology , common knowledge (logic) , common sense , psychology , social psychology , computer science , epistemic modal logic , artificial intelligence , philosophy , multimodal logic , description logic
For as long as there have been theories about common knowledge, they have been exposed to a certain amount of skepticism. Recent more sophisticated arguments question whether agents can acquire common attitudes and whether they are needed in social reasoning. I argue that this skepticism arises from assumptions about practical reasoning that, considered in themselves, are at worst implausible and at best controversial. A proper approach to the acquisition of attitudes and their deployment in decision making leaves room for common attitudes. Postulating them is no worse off than similar idealizations that are usefully made in logic and economics.