Open AccessSwinburne on Physicalism and Personal Identity
Author(s) -
Paul F. Snowdon
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
roczniki filozoficzne
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.128
H-Index - 3
eISSN - 2450-002X
pISSN - 0035-7685
DOI - 10.18290/rf21691-2
Subject(s) - physicalism , personal identity , epistemology , identity (music) , reductionism , subject (documents) , simple (philosophy) , philosophy , self , computer science , metaphysics , aesthetics , library science
In chapter 2 Swinburne rejects physicalism for two reason. The first is that it is committed to entailments that do not exist. It is suggested that this reason is questionable both because there is no persuasive reason to deny there are such entailments, and also no reason to think that physicalism has such entailments. The second reason is that the mental involves privileged access by the subject and physical features do not allow privileged access. It is proposed that the physical does in fact permit privileged access. In chapter 3 Swinburne defends the Simple View of personal identity. The reasoning is very complex and rich, but it is proposed that Swinburne has not really shown that a reductionist account cannot be correct.