Open AccessCoalition formation and eastward expansion of the european union (implications for the council)
Author(s) -
Peter Silárszky,
René Levı́nský
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
prague economic papers
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.233
H-Index - 17
eISSN - 2336-730X
pISSN - 1210-0455
DOI - 10.18267/j.pep.168
Subject(s) - voting , power (physics) , power index , index (typography) , distribution (mathematics) , european union , simple (philosophy) , member states , process (computing) , mathematical economics , computer science , economics , political science , mathematics , international trade , law , mathematical analysis , philosophy , physics , epistemology , quantum mechanics , politics , world wide web , operating system
In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Council of the European Union. The goal of this paper is to evaluate the implications of coalition formation and the entry of some Central and Eastern European countries on the voting power of the member states. The analysis is based on the Shapley-Shubik power index of simple cooperative games. Modified versions of the Shapley-Shubik index are used to analyze the influence of sub-systems of the EU on the distribution of power in the decision making process.