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Epistemological status of the narrative in scientific cognition
Author(s) -
Vitaly Yu. Yakovlev
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
aspirantskij vestnik povolžʹâ
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2410-3764
pISSN - 2072-2354
DOI - 10.17816/2072-2354.2021.21.2.31-38
Subject(s) - explication , narrative , cognition , context (archaeology) , epistemology , storytelling , psychology , sociology of scientific knowledge , comprehension , semiotics , object (grammar) , sociology , cognitive science , linguistics , philosophy , paleontology , neuroscience , biology
BACKGROUND: The article analyzes the role of narrative in scientific cognition. AIM: The aim of the article is to investigate the epistemological status of the narrative in the process of knowledge production and legitimization. MATERIALS AND METHODS: The methodology of the study is based on the semiotic concept of culture in the context of the pragmatic practice of justifying the results of scientific research. Narrative is viewed as a specific way of making sense of the world and a form of human existence in the process of knowledge generation through storytelling. The functions of narrative in the process of cognition are analyzed: generation and comprehension of knowledge, structural organization of cognitive experience, translation of individual cognitive experience into the cultural code of society. The thesis that scientific representations of the object of cognition are secondary to narrative models of understanding in the context of communicative practice of science is discussed. CONCLUSIONS: Conclusions are made about the necessity of explication in epistemology of value-semantic foundations of pragmatics of scientific knowledge, taking into account which the narrative nature of scientific knowledge should be explicitly presented in the methodological reflection of scientific research.

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