Problems of Legal Regulation as in the Case of the Concept of “Artificial Intelligence”

Numerous uses of the phrase “artificial intelligence” both in science and in legal regulation makes it impossible to carelessly and arbitrarily use this category when regulating public relations. It is this circumstance that forces us to address the problems of the conceptual and categorical apparatus and legal regulation of this category. In the paper, the author analyzes the existing approaches to the concept of artificial intelligence presented in the legal literature. The author shows that the genesis of any concept in law and outside of it is primarily related to our knowledge of the object, and concludes that it is impossible to reason about artificial intelligence in law until it is clearly defined in the technical fields of science. The author concludes that the incorporation of artificial intelligence into the ontology of law is possible within the framework of two main approaches. The conceptualist approach involves understanding the properties and knowledge about artificial intelligence as an object of the real world and the subsequent derivation of a legal definition based on this knowledge about the object. The regulatory approach is attributed to the fact that the legislator will assign artificial intelligence a certain legal status regardless of its actual properties and characteristics (by analogy with the assignment of real estate status to aircraft and ships). At the same time, without defining the approach, without analyzing the properties and characteristics of artificial intelligence as a technical and cultural phenomenon, discussions about preventive regulation are, in the author’s opinion, unfounded and not based on either science or law.