Open AccessInitiation of Criminal Proceedings against a Particular Person as the Ground for Recognizing him as a Suspect (para 1, part 1, art. 46 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation)
Author(s) -
Iraida Smolkova
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
lex russica/lex russica (russkij zakon)
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2686-7869
pISSN - 1729-5920
DOI - 10.17803/1729-5920.2021.173.4.071-078
Subject(s) - suspect , criminal code , criminal procedure , political science , legislature , law , criminal investigation , russian federation , order (exchange) , criminology , criminal law , psychology , sociology , business , regional science , finance
The paper is devoted to the analysis of a new ground for recognition of a person as a suspect, introduced under the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, namely, the initiation of a criminal case against the person. The ground under consideration has caused controversial debates among criminal process scholars. The author has carried out a retrospective analysis of the legislative regulation of this ground for giving a person the status of the suspect. The paper evaluates various doctrinal approaches to its merits and disadvantages. The author also demonstartes the need for the new ground for recognition of a person as the suspect in law enforcement on the basis of statistical data, according to which more than half of criminal cases in Russia are initiated against a particular person. The study at question reveals an interconnection between initiation of proceedings upon commission of a crime and a particular person. The conclusion is substantiated that the recognition of a person as a suspect in case of initiation of criminal proceedings against him is aimed at ensuring his right to protection from criminal prosecution. However, the issuance of the order to initiate criminal proceedings against a particular person entails the possibility of implementation of coercive criminal procedural measures against him. It is shown that suspicion forms the substantive basis of recognition of a person as the suspect. The author criticises the approach according to which the issuance of the order to initiate criminal proceedings against a particular person forms an allegation that he has committed an act prohibited under the criminal law. Under this approach the assumption is made that can later be either proven or refuted in the course of further investigation. The author criticises the practice of dividing criminal cases into a judicial perspective and lacking such a perspective, which entails violations of the rights and legitimate interests of individuals suspected in committing crimes.