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Legal Interpretation of Bribery (Statistical Analysis)
Author(s) -
G. I. Nemchenko
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
lex russica/lex russica (russkij zakon)
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2686-7869
pISSN - 1729-5920
DOI - 10.17803/1729-5920.2019.150.5.105-116
Subject(s) - language change , legislation , law enforcement , political science , law , sanctions , enforcement , norm (philosophy) , economics , business , law and economics , art , literature
Anti-corruption is one of the priorities of state policy and the most important activity of law enforcement agencies, which are given a central place in the implementation of anti-corruption legislation and its enforcement. In order to combat corruption and in accordance with paragraph 1 part 1 of the Federal law of 25.12.2008№ 273-FZ «On combating corruption» the decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 29.062018 № 378 approved the national anti-corruption plan for 2018-2020. Bribery, which is the core of economic and legal violations, occupies a special place in the structure of corruption crime. The number of crimes on the registered facts of bribery is constantly growing and deviation from the norms is transformed into an acceptable norm that contradicts the interests of the civil service and state power. Considering bribery as a type of economic criminal offense, the author proposes an analytical decomposition of crimes committed in the period 2001-2015, the natural trends and random deviations from the trend. New coverage of crimes consists in building statistical relationships, dependencies and interdependencies between contractors, which are governed by the ideology of Law and Economics. An interdisciplinary approach aimed at improving anti-corruption measures expands the scientific and methodological potential of bribery research. As a measure of dependence, correlation and regression coefficients are used in the microsystem of the transaction organized without intermediaries. The axiom of a «bribe» is offered, increasing the cost of the service of the bribetaker and distributed subsequently by the bribe-giver on consumers of the benefits created by it. The tested procedures can be used to create mechanisms for promoting anti-corruption values and scientific support of anti-corruption.

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