Open AccessLooking at HRM Through the Lens of Agency Theory – Are Suboptimal HRM Practices a Consequence of Moral Hazard?
Author(s) -
Nina Pološki Vokić
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
dynamic relationships management journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.102
H-Index - 1
eISSN - 2350-367X
pISSN - 2232-5867
DOI - 10.17708/drmj.2016.v05n02a01
Subject(s) - moral hazard , agency (philosophy) , moral agency , principal–agent problem , sociology , business , political science , psychology , social psychology , economics , social science , microeconomics , finance , corporate governance , incentive
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